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Abstract
We investigate how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has altered
the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) in North America. The theoretical analysis
suggests that NAFTA aﬀects the incentives of U.S. and non-U.S. firms locating in Mexico
diﬀerently and may lead to investment diversion from the U.S. Combining U.S. and Mexican
FDI data and using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, we find that U.S. FDI in Mexico has
increased since the inception of NAFTA in a manner that cannot be explained entirely by
the usual FDI determinants. Other countries have been using Mexico as an export platform
since before NAFTA with no discernible positive eﬀect from the agreement. We find little
evidence that inward U.S. FDI has been diverted. The results are robust to a number of
diﬀerent model and econometric specifications as well as the skill data used.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of international economic relations is the recent proliferation of regional in-
tegration schemes. The European Union (EU) has expanded its membership into Eastern Eu-
rope while at the same time continuing its move towards “deep” integration. Many developing
countries in Asia and South America have pursued economic integration amongst themselves
(ASEAN, Mercosur) or have sought free trade agreements with other developed countries or
blocs, such as the EU or the United States. In North America, the 1989 U.S.-Canada free trade
agreement was followed quickly by the inclusion of Mexico into a North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). The latter had been unique at the time as it combined two advanced
developed with a developing country, a phenomenon dubbed the ‘new regionalism’ by Ethier
(1998).
The ever increasing web of integration schemes has important eﬀects on international eco-
nomic interactions. Traditionally, the analysis of such agreements has focused on their impact
on trade flows as they potentially lead to both trade creation (between the partners in the
agreement) and trade diversion (from countries now outside of the agreement). But economic
integration and its coincident reduction in trade barriers also alters the incentives for firms when
making their location decisions. With NAFTA, the conventional wisdom is that the reduced
trade barriers facing exports from Mexico into the U.S. increase the incentive for firms to locate
in comparatively low-cost Mexico and use it as an export platform.
Another important reason why one would expect NAFTA to change the location pattern
of multinational firms is the commitment eﬀect conveyed by the agreement. The commitment
value arises as integration agreements bind future regimes to reforms undertaken and acts be-
yond any eﬀects due to specific provisions of the agreement. Thus it alleviates the well-known
time inconsistency problem whereby countries have an incentive to impose a higher tax rate ex
post although they had committed to national treatment for foreign investors ex ante. This
1
consideration is particularly relevant for Mexico with its history of political instability, default
and expropriations. Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1998) show that a trade accord indeed allows
a country to sustain a higher level of investment than without it. Waldkirch (2006) examines
the case of two Northern and one Southern country and finds that following integration between
the Southern and one of the Northern countries, the commitment eﬀect more strongly aﬀects
partner than non-partner investment due to trade creation and trade diversion eﬀects.
Hence, while the incentive to locate in Mexico rather than the U.S. (or Canada) exists for
both U.S. and non-U.S. firms, these incentives diﬀer for firms from partner versus firms from non-
partner countries. Beyond the diﬀerential commitment eﬀect, the Maquiladora program provided
for reduced duties for Mexican exports into the U.S. even before NAFTA. Upon re-importation,
Section 9802 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule stipulates that only the value-added part
of the imported good is subject to duties. Moreover, U.S. duties were relatively low even before
NAFTA. Hence, NAFTA may not greatly increase the incentive for U.S. firms to locate more
production in Mexico as compared to non-U.S. firms. Moreover, as a free trade area rather than
a customs union, NAFTA has relatively strict rules of origin. For example, 62.5 percent of an
automobile must have North American content in order to qualify for duty-free treatment. This
may reduce or increase the incentive for non-US firms to locate in Mexico. On the one hand, the
size of the investment may be bigger than optimal in the absence of rules of origin. On the other
hand, trying to force locating a production process that may be optimally placed at home, e.g.
skilled labor intensive production, may tilt the incentive towards not locating any production in
the free trade area. Finally, NAFTA reduces the trade cost of shipping any intermediate inputs
to Mexico from the U.S., but not from other countries.
This paper investigates the eﬀect of NAFTA on the location of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in North America. Despite the great importance of the eﬀects of economic integration on
firm location, there is a dearth of empirical work in that area. Waldkirch (2003) uses aggregate
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inward FDI data for Mexico to find that NAFTA appears to have raised FDI from the U.S.,
but not from other countries. Cuevas et al. (2005) use results from a cross-country study to
estimate a NAFTA eﬀect on FDI generally of about 70 percent, but do not distinguish the source
of investment. Our contribution to the literature is to investigate the eﬀect of NAFTA on FDI
more comprehensively by considering not just Mexican, but U.S. inward FDI and its possible
diversion. Moreover, by employing a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, we are better able to
disentangle the eﬀects of NAFTA from other changes in the world economy, such as a worldwide
rise in multinational activity in the 1990s, unlike the aforementioned studies.
To motivate the empirical analysis, which is the main contribution of the paper, we consider
a three-country model (two Northern countries and one Southern country) based on Ekholm
et al. (2007). The Southern country is the low-cost location and firms from either Northern
country may locate the final goods assembly process in the Southern country. Initially, trade
costs are the same among all countries.1 Then, one of the Northern countries integrates with
the Southern country. We can think of this scenario as depicting the integration of the United
States and Canada with Mexico in NAFTA.
There are a number of predictions that emerge from the theory. Chief among them is that
not only may NAFTA increase FDI in Mexico by U.S. firms, but it may also decrease investment
in the U.S., ceteris paribus, which we term ‘FDI diversion’. The eﬀect on non-U.S. investment in
Mexico is potentially ambiguous, but is clearly diﬀerent from the eﬀect on U.S. investment for
the reasons discussed above. Unlike in Ekholm et al. (2007) regional integration may not only
lead non-U.S. FDI to be shifted from the U.S. to Mexico but also back to its home country. We
then test these propositions via a single diﬀerence as well as a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator.
We include the standard determinants of FDI identified in the recent work of Markusen (2002),
which reduces the likelihood of spurious correlations, thus increasing our confidence that we
indeed isolate the eﬀect of NAFTA.
1Note, however, that we do incorporate the features of the Maquiladora program discussed above.
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We use the standard FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that has been
widely used in many studies of the determinants of multinational activity, e.g. by Brainard
(1997), Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002), Blonigen et al. (2003) and Yeaple
(2003) and add data on inward Mexican FDI from INEGI, the Mexican National Statistical
Institute. Since we need to identify source countries of investment and use compatible data
from the two sources, our data are stock data at the aggregate level. While most studies using
U.S. data use aﬃliate sales, such data are not available for Mexico. Only flows and stocks of
FDI are available from both sources. We can also not add industry detail. While the problem
of diﬀerent industry classification systems in the two countries could be overcome, albeit at the
cost of somewhat problematic concordances, there is no industry-source country detail available
for Mexico prior to 1994.2 In order to estimate the eﬀects of NAFTA, however, we need a
reasonable amount of pre-NAFTA data.
We find that NAFTA has resulted in an increase in FDI in Mexico from the U.S., but not
from other countries. We also find only scant, if any, evidence of FDI diversion from the U.S.
However, we only include foreign investment data in our empirical analysis, while the theoretical
model allows for a strictly domestic location configuration as well. Thus, we are not able to
identify U.S. investments that switch from being domestic before, but become foreign (Mexican)
after NAFTA. Investment diversion is solely by non-U.S. firms.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be very robust. We carefully correct for both
country-pair specific autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric analysis.
We use skill data drawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, e.g., Carr et al.
(2001), but also the updated schooling data from Barro and Lee as, e.g., Blonigen et al. (2003).
The results are also robust to the consideration of an “announcement eﬀect” since NAFTA was
anticipated before its formal inception.
2The U.S. and Mexico will both use the new North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in the
future, but while the U.S. has switched in 1997, all Mexican industry-level FDI is still only reported using the
Mexican classification system, CMAP.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out a three-country model of the loca-
tion choice of firms. While it restricts the set of possible location configurations for tractability,
it is suﬃciently general to allow for a range of relevant cases. The following section presents
the empirical model which is designed to allow testing of the main hypotheses generated by the
theory. After a discussion of our econometric approach and the data, the empirical results are
presented, followed by concluding remarks.
2 The Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simple model of location choice and economic integration. There are
three countries, two (initially identical) high- and one low cost country. There exists one firm in
each of the high-cost countries that is faced with the decision where to produce an intermediate
good and where to assemble the final good. We first formulate the assumptions and the game
played by the firms. We cannot find an analytical solution to this quantity-location game. While
we could use numerical simulations as in Ekholm et al. (2007), we instead concentrate on the
equilibrium candidates by dropping the strictly dominated strategies for all parameter values.
The remaining nodes of the game represent the "feasible equilibria". Then, we consider two
scenarios: one where there is no economic integration and one where one of the high cost and
the low cost country integrate. Finally, we compare the results of these two games to arrive at
testable hypotheses.
Other studies that consider economic integration and FDI are Motta and Norman (1996)
and Ekholm et al. (2007).3 The former analyzes the eﬀect of economic integration on trade
and foreign direct investment activities of oligopolists. They show that economic integration,
by improving market accessibility, will induce outside firms to invest in the integrated regional
3Grossman et al. (2006) examine the integration strategies of heterogeneous multinational firms in a three-
country setting. They do not consider economic integration eﬀects, although their model could be extended to
do that.
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bloc. They find that it is not necessarily the case that economic integration results in a net
increase in FDI in the regional bloc. If there is intra-regional FDI prior to integration, due to
increased market accessibility after integration indigenous firms from the region may switch to
intra-regional exports. In Motta and Norman (1996), final goods production takes place in a
single stage. In our model, on the other hand, the location of intermediate goods production is
in the strategy space we consider.
Ekholm et al. (2007) also use a three-region model in which there are two identical, high
cost northern economies and a small, low cost, southern economy. They find that pure export-
platform production arises in the symmetric case, when a firm in each of the high cost economies
has a plant at home, and a plant in the low cost country to serve the other high cost country. In
their model this occurs when trade costs for intermediates and plant fixed costs are moderate
and the low cost country has a moderate cost advantage in assembly. After trade liberalization
between one of the high cost countries and the low cost country, they find that the insider
northern firm chooses to locate in the southern country to service both its home market and
the third country market. The outsider northern firm builds a branch plant inside the free trade
area to serve the insider northern market, but chooses the low cost country on the basis of cost.
Our model diﬀers from Ekholm et al. (2007) in a number of respects. First, we do not
confine the production of intermediate goods to a firm’s home market; instead we assume that
at least one of the production facilities -intermediate or final- must be located in the home
market. Second, we assume that firms’ fixed costs are invariant to location strategy. Having
made this assumption, we focus on diﬀerent location configurations for sales only in the large,
high-cost economy integrating with the small, low-cost economy. Third, our results point out
that regional integration not only leads the outsider northern firm to shift production from the
insider northern economy to the low-cost, southern economy but also back to its home country.
The next section describes the game in more detail.
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2.1 Description of the Game
Consider a one-period, two-stage static game in which there are three countries, denoted E
(Europe), U (Unites States) and M (Mexico). Countries E and U are identical; they can
be referred to simply as N (North). M is a small, low cost country. There exist two final
goods sectors; X (increasing returns, imperfect competition) and Y (constant returns, perfect
competition) and one intermediate good (component) Z. Good Y is produced from a single
factor L (Labor), where one unit of L produces one unit of Y . Good X, on the other hand,
is produced using the intermediate good Z and factor L, both in fixed proportions. The linear
demand functions are derived from the quasi-linear utility function maximized subject to a
budget constraint. Income is derived from labor and profits.
maxU = φX −
µ
θ
2
¶
X2 + Y subject to L+Π = Y + pX (1)
where wages and the price of Y are numeraires. The demand function for good X is as follows:
p = φ− θX (2)
We assume that there are two firms producing X, one headquartered in E and one in U ,
and these can be referred to as firms e and u, respectively. Each firm aims to maximize profit
in country U through its choice of production location configuration and the quantities supplied
to the market. In the first stage of this location-quantity game, each firm chooses its location
configuration and in the second stage makes its quantity choice in a usual Cournot setting by
taking the market location configuration from the previous stage as given. A strategy for firm
h has two elements:
(i) the firm’s production location configuration for sales in country U which is a set of ordered
pairs
lh = {ij} (3)
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where h = (e, u}.The first element i signifies the location choice for the intermediate
goods production and the second one j for the final goods production. The configuration
lu = {UM}, for example, means that firm u supplies its own market from an assembly
plant in M which uses components produced in U . We assume that at least one of the
production facilities -intermediate or final- must be located in the home market. As a
further simplification, we assume that any production in M consists of final assembly,
which confines the intermediate goods production sites to i = {E,U} while final goods
assembly can be done anywhere, j = {E,U,M}. Finally, sinceM is small, we assume that
it has no domestic demand, and so neither firm will build a plant inM simply to serveM .
These assumptions still leave us with a wealth of possibilities to explore such that there
are a total of 4 location configurations for each firm which generates 16 potential market
supply strategies in country U . Define a market location configuration as:
l = {le, lu} ∈ L (4)
where L is the set of all possible production location configurations for sales in country U .
(ii) the firm’s quantity choice which is
xh(l) (5)
where xh(l) > 0 indicates that firm h is active in country U ; xh(l) = 0 indicates that firm
h chooses not to sell in country U . Costs of production for the two firms are assumed
identical. Unit costs for components production in country i, (zi) and final goods produc-
tion in country j, (cj) need not be identical. These costs are identical across E and U , but
lower in M , i.e. zM < zN and cM < cN .
Establishment by firm h of a production facility in country i or j incurs a set-up cost F
and we simplify the analysis by assuming that these set-up costs are neither country nor firm
specific. Observe that a firm’s quantity choice in two markets is independent and determined by
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the market location configuration l, and therefore the total set-up cost of establishing production
facilities for sales in country U always adds up to 2F .
Trade costs are assumed to be ad-valorem. The tariﬀ rate is tij ∈ (0, 1), i 6= j for components
trade from country i to country j, and tjk ∈ (0, 1), j 6= k for final goods trade from country j
to country k. We assume that tij = tjk = t for the sake of simplicity. This rate becomes zero
between a country pair in the case of economic integration. On a given link we assume that
the cost is the same in both directions for reciprocity reasons.
Aggregate supply to consumers in country U given the market location configuration l, is:
X(l) =
X
h
xh(l) (6)
and the aggregate profit to firm h from sales in country U with market location configuration l
and market quantity choice xh(l) is:
Πh(l, xh(l)) = (1− t)[p(X(l)]xh(l)− bch(lh)xh(l)− 2F (7)
where bch(lh) = [1+ t]zi+ cj for i = {E,U} and j = {E,U,M}. For example if firm e chooses to
produce the intermediates in E and assembles them in U for sales in U , then le = EU . In this
case, the production costs will be bce(le) = [1 + t]zE + cU .
The exception is the configuration, lu = {UM}, where bcu(UM) = zU+cM . Before integration,
tariﬀs for imports of final goods from M to U are only levied on the value-added portion.4 This
is consistent with the Maquiladora program that has been in existence for many years and
has facilitated production in Mexico by U.S. firms. It is important to account for the special
provisions since they aﬀect the impact of North American integration on partner versus non-
partner firms.
Denote by Xh(l) the set of possible quantity choices in market U for firm h given the market
location configuration l. The Nash equilibrium for the second-stage quantity sub-game for any
4If we drop the location indicators and firm superscripts, in the Maquiladora case the profits of firm u can be
written as Π = p(X)x− zUx− cMx− tUMzUx− tMU (p(X)− zU )x− 2F where (p(X)− zU )x is the value added
from the assembly activities. If tUM = tMU = t, then Π = (1− t)p(X)x− ecx− 2F where ec = zU + cM .
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market location configuration l is the market quantity choice x∗(l) such that5:
Πh(l, x∗(l)) ≥ Πh(l, xh(l), x∗−h(l)) for all xh(l) ∈ Xh(l) (8)
Denote by Π∗h(l∗) the profit to firm h from the Nash equilibrium market quantity choice cor-
responding to the production location configuration l. An equilibrium for the first-stage location
game is a market location configuration l∗ such that:
Π∗h(l∗) ≥ Π∗h(lh, l∗−h) for all l ∈ L (9)
2.2 Before Integration
Table 1 presents the market supply strategies and their associated payoﬀs before integration.
Each cell is assigned a number which is stated at the lower left corner of the corresponding cell.
The payoﬀs are the profits made by each firm in the equilibrium of the Cournot game. Each
cell in this table represents a market location configuration, l = {le, lu} ∈ L where elements
of l describe the respective supply strategies of firms e and u in country U . For example, cell
number 6 in Table 1 is l = {EU,UM} which translates as follows: Firm e supplies country U
from an assembly plant in U which uses components produced in E, whereas firm u supplies
country U from an assembly plant in M which uses components produced in U .
5Aggregate profit to firms e and u from sales in country U with production location configuration L and market
quantity choice xh(l) can be expressed respectively as follows:
Πe(l, xe(l)) = (1− t)[φ− θX(l)]xe(l)− ece(le)xe(l)− 2F
Πu(l, xu(l)) = (1− t)[φ− θX(l)]xu(l)− ecu(lu)xu(l)− 2F
where Xk(l) = xe(l) + xu(l).
Maximizing these two equations with respect to xe(l) and xu(l) in that order and solving for xe(l) and xu(l) in
the first order conditions gives the equilibrium profit levels for each firm as
Πe(l, xe(l)) = (1− t)θ[xe(l)]2 − 2F
Πu(l, xu(l)) = (1− t)θ[xu(l)]2 − 2F
where
xe(l) =
(1− t)2φ+ (1− t)ecu(lu)− 2(1− t)ece(le)
3(1− t)2θ and
xu(l) =
(1− t)2φ+ (1− t)ece(le)− 2(1− t)ecu(lu)
3(1− t)2θ
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We cannot find an analytical solution to this quantity-location game. While we could use
numerical simulations, we instead concentrate on the equilibrium candidates by dropping the
strictly dominated strategies for all parameter values. Then we derive the changes in these
candidates due to economic integration. The shaded cells in the tables are the candidates for
equilibria in this quantity-location game, namely the feasible equilibria.6 Any one or more than
one of these cells can be the equilibrium/equilibria depending on the parameter values.
Before economic integration between U andM , UE and EU are strictly dominated strategies
for firm u and UE is a strictly dominated strategy for firm e. The intuition is that if firm u
outsources any part of its production process, it will always be toM since it has lower production
cost than E, while trade cost are no higher.
Lemma 1 Prior to economic integration between U and M, if u does not invest in M, neither
does e.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for firm u is lu
∗
= UU for sales in U , then EM can never be the
dominant strategy for firm e. Note that firm e always deviates from cell number 3 to cell number
2 since the condition for UU to be dominant for firm u also satisfies the condition for EU to
dominate EM for firm e. If firm u chooses to remain national, then even though unit costs are
lower in M , firm e will not prefer to produce intermediates in E, ship them to M for assembly
and reship the finished product to U and thus pay tariﬀs twice. In other words, if firm u chooses
UU over UM , then firm e will never choose EM over EU since the production cost diﬀerences
between North (E and U) and South (M) are not large enough to cover trade costs for both the
shipment of the intermediates and the final products for firm e to prefer EM.
6A sample of the calculations that generate these results can be obtained from the authors on request.
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2.3 After Integration
Given that we are chiefly interested in the eﬀects of North American economic integration on
foreign direct investment, we concentrate on the case in which a regional bloc is established
between countries U and M. In that case, the tariﬀ barriers on both intermediate and final
goods trade between U and M are completely lifted, making tUM = tMU = 0.
Table 2 shows the payoﬀ matrix after such integration. Notice the reductions in the number
of candidate equilibria compared to the situation before integration. For firm u, UU , UE and
EU are strictly dominated strategies and UE and EU are strictly dominated strategies for firm
e. Only cells number 7 and 8 remain as equilibrium candidates after integration.7
Changes in the feasible equilibria after economic integration yield a rich set of propositions
about FDI creation/diversion in each of the production locations. We restrict our attention to
the possibilities which can be derived analytically without numerical simulations. All of our
propositions assume that demand in both markets remains unaﬀected by integration.
Proposition 1 Economic integration between U and M has an FDI diversion eﬀect in U if
le
∗
= EU before integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition rests on the fact that for firm e, the strategy involving production in U ,
EU , is a dominated strategy after integration. Thus, if before integration the dominant strategy
is le
∗
U = EU , then final assembly is shifted either to E, in which case there is only investment
diversion, or to M , in which case there is investment creation in M . Note that UU becomes a
dominated strategy for firm u, but since we focus on foreign, not domestic investment, we do
not test this prediction of the model.
7 Intuitively, one expects EM to dominate EE for firm e after integration since it involves lower assembly costs
and a tariﬀ only on the intermediate goods as opposed to higher assembly costs and a tariﬀ on the final good in
case of EE. However, note that after integration cell number 8 involves a higher market price when compared to
cell number 7. Therefore, it is possible to observe EE as the dominant strategy for firm e and thus no FDI after
integration. The proof is available upon request.
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Proposition 2 Economic integration between U and M increases firm u’s investment in M if
lu
∗
= UU before integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition stems from the fact that UU becomes a dominated strategy for firm u
after integration. If that strategy was dominant before integration, some production is shifted
from U to M which is the dominant strategy for firm u after integration. If the pre-integration
equilibrium is not UU , there may be no change in M -production by firm u.
Proposition 3 Economic integration between U and M increases third-country (E) investment
in M only if le
∗
= EU and lu
∗
= UU before integration.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the dominant strategy for firm e before integration is le
∗
= EU and lu
∗
= UU for firm u,
then final assembly is shifted to M by firm e, and non-partner country investment in M will
increase. This is because the conditions for EU to be dominant for firm e before integration also
satisfy the condition for EM to dominate EE for firm e after integration. Note that a switch
from EM before integration to EE after integration (and thus investment diversion from M) is
not possible since the condition for EE to be dominated before integration by any other strategy
is the same after integration and does not involve the tariﬀ between integrating countries.8
Conversely, if the dominant strategy for firm u before and after integration is lu
∗
= UM,
then firm e supplies U with exports from E. This is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If firm u has investment in M before integration (the Maquiladora case) then an
increase in third-country (E) investment in M is not guaranteed.
8However, the condition does involve the unit cost of producing in M . One could model rules of origin as
increasing this unit cost since they force a firm to locate additional parts of the production process along with
the optimally located ones in M in order to achieve the required minimum local content, as discussed above. In
that case, a switch from EM to EE (and thus investment diversion from M) is a distinct possibility.
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In summary, the model predicts that FDI in U may be diverted toM , and that both partner
as well as non-partner country investment in the low-cost country, M , may increase. However,
the conditions under which investment from the partner versus the non-partner country increases
diﬀer for the two sets of countries, i.e. the identity of the source country matters. Thus, the
question whether there is investment diversion from the U.S. and investment creation in Mexico,
and by whom, is an empirical one.
3 The Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy is to test the propositions from the theoretical model outlined above
while including control variables drawn from the existing literature on the determinants of
foreign direct investment.9 These come from the seminal study by Brainard (1997) and the
pioneering work of Markusen (1997) and Markusen (2002), which were put to an empirical test
in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002).
We test the propositions generated by the theoretical model employing a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator. Specifically, let
FDIijt = α+ βdr + γDh + δ (dr ·Dh) (10)
where FDIijt is FDI in i from source j at time t; r denotes the regime (NAFTA or non-NAFTA)
and h denotes host-type, to be explained below. dr is a dichotomous variable that is equal to
one if the regime is NAFTA (1994 and later), and equal to zero if it is not.10
Dh is a vector of dichotomous variables, one for each of three host types. Let dh1 equal one
if the U.S. is the host country of FDI, for any source country. Let dh2 equal one if Mexico is the
9Ekholm et al. (2007) also conduct an empirical analysis, which, however, is very diﬀerent from ours. Their
dependent variable is the share of aﬃliate sales of US multinationals that go to third countries rather than foreign
investment. They only use US data and do not have a breakdown of these shares by country.
10As a robustness check, we vary the starting point of NAFTA in consideration of a possible announcement
eﬀect. We also experimented with including separate dichotomous variables for 1994 onwards and 1999 onwards,
recognizing that tariﬀ cuts were phased in. This did not change the results (Available upon request).
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host and the U.S. is the source country. Finally, let dh3 equal one if Mexico is the host country
and the source is any country other than the U.S. The model thus can be written as
FDIijt = α+ βdr +
3X
k=1
γkdhk +
3X
k=1
δk (dr · dhk) (11)
The estimated impact of NAFTA for a particular host-type is then given by the δk’s, the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator. Proposition 1, which states the possibility of FDI diversion
from the U.S., implies that δ1 is negative. Propositions 2 and 3, which state the possibility
of increased FDI in Mexico from the U.S. and other countries, respectively, imply significantly
positive δ2 and δ3, respectively. To see this, note that α is the baseline eﬀect for observations
that are pre-NAFTA (dr = 0) and are not of a (future) NAFTA host (dhk = 0 ∀ k). Then,
α + β is the eﬀect of NAFTA on non-NAFTA hosts. The diﬀerence, i.e. the “NAFTA-eﬀect”
is therefore given by β. For host type k, the pre- and post-NAFTA eﬀects on FDI are given by
α+ γk and α+β+ γk+ δk, respectively, with the diﬀerence, the “NAFTA-eﬀect”, being β+ δk.
Hence, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is given by δk. While the signs, magnitudes and
significance levels of the δk’s are going to be of central interest, we will also report the single
diﬀerence results.
Two comments on the use of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator are in order before we
proceed to the other controls included in the empirical model. First, since the eﬀects of NAFTA
are all relative to a control group, the identity of the control group matters. Our control group
consists of countries other than the NAFTA countries that are hosts to U.S. FDI (see Table 3b
for a listing of countries and years included). We have chosen this control group largely because
it allows us to limit ourselves to just two data sources, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) and the Mexican Statistical Institute (INEGI). The data section below will provide
more details on the data. The inclusion of other OECD countries would have required the use of
other data sources where comparability questions and thus mismeasurement loom large and may
seriously contaminate the results. One could argue that U.S. outward FDI may also be aﬀected
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by NAFTA. However, most U.S. outward FDI is in other highly-developed countries which are
quite dissimilar from Mexico and thus unlikely to contain many competing hosts. Secondly,
Bertrand et al. (2004) point out econometric problems in the use of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator. We discuss how we address these in the next section.
For other control variables to include in the empirical model, we appeal to the standard FDI
literature. We employ the most general specification from Markusen and Maskus (2002) as our
base specification. We also use similar specifications to those suggested in Blonigen et al., 2003,
Braconier et al., 2005, and Waldkirch, 2003.11
Thus, we augment the model by including the following controls:
FDI = f
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
sumgdp, gdpdiﬀsq , d2skdgdpd, d2skdsumg, d1skdsumg,
invcosthost , topenhost, topensrc, distance
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (12)
The first term, sumgdp, is expected to be positive as larger combined market size will
encourage foreign production. The second term, gdpdiﬀsq, squared diﬀerences in GDP between
the host and the parent country of foreign investment, is expected to be negative as unequal-sized
countries should encourage exporting rather than setting up a plant in the foreign market.
The next three terms are more complicated interaction terms. The third term, d2skdgdpd,
interacts skill diﬀerences with GDP diﬀerences and a dummy equal to one if the skilled labor
abundant country is the parent country. Multinationals are discouraged if skill and GDP dif-
ferences are too large since the market of the small country is too small and the skilled labor
abundant parent country has a comparative advantage in (skill-intensive) headquarter services.
The other two terms are interactions of GDP sums and skill diﬀerences. The fourth term,
d2skdsumg, is again nonzero if the parent country is skilled-labor intensive. Skill diﬀerences
encourage vertical diﬀerentiation of the production process, but not horizontal multinationals,
since skill diﬀerences make skilled labor too expensive in that case. Therefore, its sign is theoret-
11For a detailed discussion of the knowledge-capital model and its empirical implementation, see Markusen’s
(2002) book.
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ically ambiguous. The next term, d1skdsumg, is nonzero if the skilled labor abundant country
is the host country of investment. If this is the case, inward FDI is discouraged for all types of
multinationals since the skilled labor abundant country would be expected to be the parent, but
not the host country of investment. As a robustness check, we include simpler skill variables for
both source and host countries.
Four additional controls are included. First is a measure of the cost of investing in the host
country. It accounts for formal investment barriers as well as the overall economic climate that
aﬀects the decision where to invest. Higher investment costs deter FDI and hence a negative
sign is expected for this regressor. Parent country and host country (Mexican) trade costs are
measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, an often used measure for the trade
openness of a country. It is used over others because it is available for the entire sample period.
Since greater openness corresponds to lower trade costs, a positive sign is expected for parent
country, but a negative sign for host country trade costs.12 Finally, distance is measured as the
distance between country capitals. Its sign is theoretically ambiguous since it can proxy for both
trade and investment costs. It is included since it usually performs well in gravity-type models.
We should note that ascribing the eﬀects that we find solely to NAFTA is clearly problematic
as other events during the time period that we are looking at may aﬀect the pattern of FDI as
well and we have only limited ways to control for those. In addition to NAFTA, Mexico joined
the OECD in 1994, but more importantly, the 1994 peso crisis led to a steep real depreciation of
the peso, followed by a real appreciation in the years afterwards. We control for these eﬀects by
including Mexican GDP, which fell considerably in 1995. We could also include exchange rates
in order to account more directly for the monetary eﬀects of the crisis, but chose to follow real
trade theory and omit them.13
12Endogeneity may be a concern with this openness measure. However, other measures such as an index from
the Global Competitiveness Report are highly correlated with any measure of investment cost. In any case,
omitting the openness variables does not change the qualitative results.
13We did include exchange rates as a robustness checks, which did not aﬀect the results at all.
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4 Econometric Considerations and Data
4.1 Econometric Considerations
The data are in panel form and preliminary tests indicated that both autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity were present. Therefore, we use a panel data model (Prais-Winsten regression)
with panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where the autocor-
relation coeﬃcient is assumed to be diﬀerent for each observational unit (country pair). The
variance-covariance matrix is computed under the assumption that the disturbances are het-
eroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across units, where each pair of cross-sectional
units has their own covariance. For each element in the covariance matrix, all available obser-
vations that are common to the two units contributing to the covariance are used to compute
it, given that the panel is unbalanced.14
We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of the sample
period. We apply the following rules. Since we are primarily interested in the eﬀects of NAFTA,
we need suﬃcient data for both the pre- and the post-NAFTA time periods. We have at most
seven years of post-NAFTA data (1994-2000) and only use country-pair observations for which
we have at least seven years of pre-NAFTA information for all variables. In order to implement
the correction for autocorrelation, no gaps in the data are allowed. Hence, when there is a gap,
we limit ourselves to using post-gap information. In other words, if 1983 is available, 1984 is
missing, and 1985 onwards is available, the data for this country-pair starts in 1985. One of
the robustness checks uses a larger number of observations, although a minimum of five must
still be imposed in order to allow for the computation of the autocorrelation coeﬃcients for all
country pairs.
Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that ignoring serial correlation in diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
14We also ran the regressions under the assumption of a common AR coeﬃcient, which resulted in no qualitative
changes in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results. These are available upon request.
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estimation can lead to severely biased standard errors. While we account for the problem
by estimating a first-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient, we also use one of the techniques they
suggest which works well for samples of more than 20 observational units (we have at least 70
country pairs). It requires estimating standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance
structure between time periods, using a generalized White-like formula. This estimator of the
variance-covariance matrix is consistent as the number of country pairs tends to infinity.
4.2 Data
Mexican FDI data come from the Mexican National Statistical Institute (INEGI). These are FDI
stocks in Mexico from 1980 on, published in U.S. dollars. In the empirical analysis, nominal
values are converted to real dollars using the U.S. producer price index for capital equipment.
The data distinguish ten source countries throughout the sample period. They account for about
90 percent of total FDI in Mexico. Since 1994, more source country and especially industry detail
is available, but since we need suﬃcient pre-1994 data, we cannot use the additional detail in
this study. No industry or additional source country detail is available retroactively for the time
before NAFTA.
For most of the 1980s, investment flows exhibit large variation, for example around the time
of Mexico’s financial crisis in the early 1980s, but do not increase much over time. They do
increase noticeably in the late 1980s and then a large and sustained increase occurs with the
inception of NAFTA. The first substantial increase in FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s
coincided with a major overhaul of Mexico’s investment laws in 1989. Many obstacles to foreign
investors, such as licensing requirements and restrictions pertaining to majority ownership, were
removed. This change reversed Mexico’s long-standing policy of reserving ownership in many
sectors to Mexican nationals or the Mexican state and encouraging foreign investment only in
sectors that were deemed crucial to the pursuit of import substitution policies. At the same time,
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and earlier than in many other countries in the region, substantial privatizations occurred. By
1994, the number of state-owned enterprises had decreased to only 80, down from 1155. However,
as Franko (1999: 158-61) points out, foreign investors participated in this sale only to a small
degree. FDI from privatization constituted only 7.9 percent of total FDI between 1990 and 1995.
Yet, during the first half of the 1990s, Mexico was the major recipient of FDI in Latin America.
Brazil subsequently surpassed Mexico in that role, mainly because Brazil’s major privatizations
occurred in the second half of the 1990s. Lately, greenfield investment and acquisitions of local
firms have dominated in Mexico. In 1997, 62 percent of FDI consisted of international investors
acquiring local firms. According to CEPAL (1999), recent large acquisitions include several
banks, beverage and tobacco companies.
The United States has been the most important source country both before and after 1994.
Sizable flows have also originated in European Union countries and Japan. The share of North
American investment in Mexico has decreased since 1994, even though Canada’s share alone has
increased. The U.S. share has fallen from over 80 percent in the early 1980s to about 60 percent
since NAFTA took eﬀect. The vast majority of foreign investment originates in other developed
countries. The only sizable investment flows from other countries are from South Korea and
India, the latter being largely a one-time large purchase of a Mexican steel company.
U.S. inward and outward FDI data come from the standard source used in most studies of
U.S. FDI, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data are described in detail elsewhere.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of FDI in Mexico and the United States since 1980.
Control variable data also come from standard sources. We use PPP-adjusted GDP data
from the Penn World Tables (6.1). Trade data come from the same source. For investment
costs, we use the comprehensive measure from Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI),
which is a composite measure of operations risk, political risk, and a remittance and repatriation
factor index. We adjust it such that a higher number corresponds to higher costs.
20
An important control variable in many studies is skill. The two most common sources of
skill data are the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Barro/Lee data on schooling.
We use both in our analysis to ensure the robustness of our results. The ILO data measure the
number of workers in a particular occupation and characterize some as skilled, some as unskilled,
employing the skill definitions from Carr et al. (2001). A country’s skill level then is represented
by the share of skilled workers. We fill in missing data using a linear trend between non-missing
years. For just a few countries, additional years are filled in using the growth rate of the skilled
labor share between non-missing years. Alternatively, we use the Barro/Lee data on years of
schooling. These are available only in five-year intervals and we fill in missing values using a
linear trend as well.15 Table 3a contains summary statistics; Table 1b lists the countries and
years, separately for host and source observations.
5 Results
Tables 4-7 report the results. Tables 4a and 6a show the results from running a Prais-Winsten
regression as outlined above and Tables 4b and 6b contain robustness checks. Table 4 uses the
ILO skill data, while Table 6 uses the Barro/Lee skill data. Tables 5 and 7 present the simple
diﬀerence and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation results, which are of central interest here.
The results reported in the first three rows of Tables 5 and 7 test Propositions 1-3. Specifica-
tion (1) is our base specification. The sample contains only source-host country pairs for which
we have at least 14 observations, i.e. suﬃcient pre- and post-NAFTA information. Specification
(2) includes country pairs with fewer observations, which increases the sample size from 1,387
to 1,595 observations. However, many of the newly included country pairs still have twelve or
13 observations. Specification (3) accounts for a possible announcement eﬀect by starting the
NAFTA regime dummy in 1992 rather than 1994.16
15Filling in missing values with repeated values from prior or future years does not change the results.
16Dating the announcement eﬀect to 1991 or 1993 makes no diﬀerence to the results. These are available upon
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Turning to Table 3, we first notice that there is only scant evidence of a FDI diversion eﬀect
from the U.S. since the eﬀect, while negative, is statistically significant at only the ten percent
level in one specification and then only when looking at the simple diﬀerence estimator (β+δ1).
It is not significant in any of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results (δ1).17
This remains true for several robustness checks. Specification (4) uses simple skill variables
instead of the complex interaction terms suggested by Markusen and Maskus (2002). We include
the share of skilled workers in the total workforce separately for host and source countries of
FDI. Specifications (5) and (6) use an alternative econometric technique, suggested by Bertrand
et al.’s (2004) concern about serial correlation in diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimations. While
the Prais-Winsten method corrects for serial correlation, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that
the correction may not be appropriate since it does not take into account second- or third-order
autocorrelation. Thus, we apply one of their suggested solutions, namely computing an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix, to both our base specification (1) and the specification with simpler
skill terms. Results are shown in the bottom half of Table 5.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator for inward U.S. FDI is marginally negative in (5),
but not in any other specification. When using the Barro/Lee skill data (Table 7), none of the
computed eﬀects on U.S. inward FDI are significant. We thus conclude that there is at best
very weak evidence of a FDI diversion eﬀect from the U.S.
The next row of Tables 5 and 7 addresses FDI from the U.S. into Mexico. Here, there is a
statistically significant and economically large positive eﬀect, suggesting that NAFTA has led
to an increase in FDI in Mexico from the U.S. Almost all coeﬃcients, whether simple diﬀerence
(β+δ2) or diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (δ2), are significant at the one percent level, regardless of
specification or skill data used. Thus, this is an extremely robust result. In order to get a sense
of the estimated economic eﬀect of NAFTA for U.S. investment in Mexico, we can calculate the
request.
17Calculating the economic eﬀect from the point estimates reveals that, if significant, NAFTA results in an
eight percent drop in inward U.S. FDI.
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predicted amount of FDI by the final year of the sample period with and without NAFTA. We
find that this stock is about 24 percent higher than it would have been without NAFTA. We
stress again that this eﬀect includes events that we did not control for. Nonetheless, NAFTA
appears to have had an important eﬀect on U.S. FDI in Mexico.18
The final row in Tables 5 and 7 shows the estimated NAFTA-eﬀect on FDI from non-
U.S. sources into Mexico. Here, the results are somewhat mixed. All twelve simple diﬀerence
estimates have a negative sign, four significantly so. Only two diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates
are significantly negative, the rest are not statistically significant. We can conclude that we
cannot find any evidence of an increase of non-U.S. FDI in Mexico due to NAFTA, although
there may have been a decrease. The reason appears to be that FDI from these sources was
much higher than implied by the usual determinants even before NAFTA was implemented, as
suggested by the uniformly large and significantly positive coeﬃcient γ3, which indicates that
eﬀect.
The diﬀerential results with respect to U.S. and non-U.S. FDI into Mexico underscore the
importance of distinguishing between these two fundamentally diﬀerent sources of FDI. They
also confirm findings elsewhere using only Mexican data (Waldkirch, 2003, Cuevas et al., 2003).
The novel result here is that this is confirmed when we add U.S. (inward and outward) data and
that there is little, if any, evidence of a FDI diversion eﬀect in the U.S.
The determinants of FDI shown in the first half of Tables 4a/4b and 6a/6b largely have
the expected signs and are statistically significant, although the choice of skill data apparently
matters. As shown in other work, total market size has a large positive eﬀect on FDI, whereas
market size diﬀerences deter it. The signs on the skill variables are mostly consistent with
Markusen’s knowledge-capital model, although more so when using the ILO skill data. Consis-
18Note that the model appears to be doing well in predicting FDI. The correlation between actual and predicted
FDI stocks is 0.65, statistically significant at the one percent level. Blonigen and Davies (2004) find that in their
data, the residuals are unreasonably large and diﬀer systematically between rich and poor countries. Our residuals
appear to be of reasonable size and do not diﬀer in any systematic way.
23
tent with the predictions of that model, host country investment costs have a negative, source
country trade openness has a positive eﬀect, while the eﬀect of host country openness is more
ambiguous, though largely positive.
In summary, we find that NAFTA has aﬀected the location of North American FDI largely
by increasing U.S. FDI in Mexico. Other countries have been using Mexico as an export platform
well before NAFTA. There is hardly any evidence of FDI diversion from the U.S. The inclusion of
determinants of FDI that are well-established in the literature, a careful econometric specification
that corrects for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, and the use of various measures of skill
endowments make us confident that our results provide a good assessment of the eﬀect of NAFTA
on the pattern of FDI in the United States and Mexico.
6 Conclusion and Directions for Future Work
This paper has investigated the eﬀect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the
distribution of FDI in North America. We built a simple three-country model of location choice.
While the model is straightforward, it generates several interesting propositions. There is a
possibility that NAFTA results in FDI diversion from the United States. While FDI in Mexico
is likely to increase, the incentives for firms from NAFTA partners versus non-partner countries
are aﬀected diﬀerently. This is due to the existence of the Maquiladora program before NAFTA,
but also to strict rules of origin and a possible commitment eﬀect that aﬀect partner countries
more than non-partner ones.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that combines both U.S. and Mexican FDI data to
test these hypotheses. Using a careful econometric analysis, we find that U.S. FDI in Mexico
was positively aﬀected by NAFTA. At the same time, there is scant, if any, evidence of FDI
diversion from the U.S. Non-U.S. firms have been using Mexico as an export platform to the
U.S. well before NAFTA and we find no evidence that NAFTA has resulted in an increasing use
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of Mexico as a production location for these countries. If anything, FDI may have decreased.
These results are robust to the nature of the skill endowment data chosen, the consideration of
an “announcement” eﬀect as well as to the inclusion of country-pair observations with a shorter
time series. Moreover, we carefully take the serial correlation in the data into account and
employ specifications that avoid biasing our standard errors.
In future work, we will consider several extensions, both to the theory and the empirics.
The theory should incorporate plant-level scale economies through an integrated equilibrium
approach. In order to draw distinct conclusions, however, this will require numerical solutions.
We also envision a dynamic rather than a static game for economic integration, which will be
capable of including announcement and commitment eﬀects more formally.
On the empirical side, we note that even in its current form, our theoretical model also
provides a rich set of results regarding the eﬀect of NAFTA on trade within the region as well
as with other countries. These conclusions can be tested using available trade data. We are
especially interested in separating out the eﬀects on intermediate versus final goods trade.
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Table 3a: Summary Statistics for Basic Specification, Alternative Skill Measures
ILO skill measure Barro/Lee skill measure
Regressor Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
realfdi 12,542 2,088 26,918 11,110 1,682 25,163
sumgdp 6,404 6,743 2,361 6,546 6,795 2,357
gdpdiﬀsq 3.6E07 3.6E07 2.1E07 3.6E07 3.6E07 2.1E07
d2skdgdpd 213.6 0 517.6 11,251 0 17,132
d2skdsumg 355.4 81.49 533.3 13,607 0 19,668
d1skdsumg 314.6 0 523.1 16,523 1,959 20.670
invcosthost 39.99 31.67 13.84 39.37 31.67 13.45
topenhost 37.49 25.97 28.35 35.55 25.66 26.59
topensrc 43.80 29.55 36.39 43.27 31.76 34.64
distance 8,020 7,130 3,547 8,278 7,222 3,693
dNAFTA 0.45 0 0.50 0.46 0 0.50
dUShost 0.47 0 0.50 0.50 1 0.50
dMexhostUS 0.02 0 0.12 0.01 0 0.11
dMexhostnonUS 0.14 0 0.34 0.12 0 0.33
Table 3b: Countries and Years Included
Country Years Source Years Host Country Years Source Years Host
United States 1980-2000 1982-2000 Italy 1980-2000 1982-2000
Mexico 1980-2000 1980-2000 Japan 1980-2000 1982-2000
Argentina 1980-2000 1982-2000 Korea - 1982-2000
Australia 1980-2000 1982-2000 Malaysia 1980-2000 1982-2000
Austria 1980-2000 1982-2000 Netherlands 1980-2000 1982-2000
Belgium 1980-2000 1982-2000 New Zealand 1980-2000 -
Brazil 1980-2000 1982-2000 Norway 1980-2000 1982-2000
Canada 1980-2000 1982-2000 Pakistan - 1982-2000
Chile 1985-2000 1982-2000 Panama 1980-2000 -
Colombia 1980-2000 1982-2000 Peru - 1982-2000
Czech Rep. - 1993-2000* Philippines 1980-2000 1982-2000
Denmark 1980-2000 1990-2000 Poland 1984-2000 1989-2000*
Ecuador 1982-2000 1982-2000 Portugal - 1990-2000*
Egypt - 1982-2000 Spain 1980-2000 1982-2000
Finland 1980-2000 1990-2000* Sweden 1980-2000 1982-2000
Germany 1980-2000 1982-2000 Switzerland 1980-2000 1982-2000
Greece 1986-2000 - Thailand 1980-2000 1982-2000
Hong Kong 1980-2000 - Turkey 1984-2000 1989-2000*
Hungary - 1990-2000* United Kingdom 1980-2000 1982-2000
Ireland 1986-2000 1982-2000 Uruguay 1989-2000* -
Israel 1980-2000 1982-2000 Venezuela - 1982-2000
Notes: * indicates that this country is only included in the extended sample (5+ observations), not
in the base sample.
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Table 4a: Prais-Winsten Regression Results: ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3)
Regressor 14+ observation 5+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
sumgdp 28.68*** 28.76*** 28.58***
(2.981) (3.023) (3.074)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
d2skdgdpd -16.21*** -14.57*** -16.33***
(2.975) (2.841) (3.025)
d2skdsumg 1.563 3.244 1.848
(2.338) (2.265) (2.364)
d1skdsumg -3.149** -2.136 -3.124**
(1.556) (1.483) (1.484)
invcosthost -147.8 -217.7** -167.7*
(108.5) (106.7) (108.7)
topenhost 193.4*** 133.4*** 180.4***
(35.88) (28.17) (35.85)
topensrc 132.4*** 132.5*** 112.8***
(18.99) (19.84) (17.97)
distance -1.663*** -1.755*** -1.633***
(0.296) (0.304) (0.287)
β -1,758 -1,840 -508.2
(2,175) (1,787) (2,181)
γ1 -13,840*** -12,853*** -14,355***
(4,879) (4,778) (5,058)
γ2 -6,909*** -7,071*** -6,721***
(2,317) (2,375) (2,331)
γ3 69,153*** 71,589*** 67,242***
(9,332) (9,348) (9,609)
δ1 -1,242 -559.0 -1,615
(1,194) (725.9) (1,219)
δ2 13,421*** 14,959*** 9,873***
(2,685) (2,886) (2,721)
δ3 -532.0 319.9 -763.9
(3,157) (2,531) (3,084)
Number of obs. 1,387 1,475 1,387
R2 0.46 0.45 0.45
Wald χ2 464.6 442.9 334.1
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. 0.847 0.852 0.848
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Regressions correct for
first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country
pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text for details.
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Table 4b: Robustness Checks: ILO Skill Data
(4) (5) (6)
Regressor Simple Skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple Skill
sumgdp 27.36*** 16.22*** 17.40***
(2.839) (3.705) (3.310)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.01***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
d2skdgdpd -30.10***
(6.482)
d2skdsumg 12.24
(7.882)
d1skdsumg -1.560
(4.741)
Skill source 86,419*** 83,011***
(18,209) (27,893)
Skill host 93,888*** 116,106***
(18,855) (42,328)
invcosthost -124.8 357.8 398.5
(114.0) (327.0) (292.5)
topenhost 102.0*** 212.6** 172.5**
(36.73) (101.3) (83.38)
topensrc 118.2*** 99.27* 88.80
(23.15) (53.13) (56.08)
distance -1.567*** -1.116** -0.775*
(0.298) (0.483) (0.411)
β -3,011 6,280* 142.9
(2,100) (3,518) (2,950)
γ1 -6,181 -1,135 4,235
(5,333) (10,637) (9,652)
γ2 -3,669 187.9 4,642
(2,648) (4,153) (3,785)
γ3 87,826*** 25,998** 51,891***
(11,427) (11,903) (11,418)
δ1 492.6 -10,041* -1,782
(1,232) (5,526) (4,319)
δ2 11,192*** 16,811*** 16,477***
(2,524) (4,032) (4,022)
δ3 -2,011 -15,877** -12,956**
(2,641) (6,104) (5,103)
Number of obs. 1,387 1,387 1,387
R2 0.49 0.47 0.48
Wald χ2 551.0 . .
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 . .
Average autocorr. 0.842 N/A N/A
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Specification (4) corrects
for first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country
pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. Specifications (5) and (6) compute an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix. See the text for details.
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Table 5: The Eﬀect of NAFTA on North American FDI, ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3)
14+ observations 5+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
Simple diﬀerence -3,000* -2,399 -2,124
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,780) (1,719) (1,773)
Simple Diﬀerence 11,663*** 13,119*** 9,365***
U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (3,300) (3,382) (3,480)
Simple Diﬀerence -2,290 -1,520 -1,272
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (1,750) (1,616) (1,763)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -1,242 -559.0 -1,615
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,194) (725.9) (1,219)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 13,421*** 14,959*** 9,873***
U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,685) (2,886) (2,721)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -532.0 319.9 -763.9
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ3 (3,157) (2,531) (3,084)
(4) (5) (6)
Simple skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple skill
Simple diﬀerence -2,518 -3,761 -1,639
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (2,090) (3,143) (2,528)
Simple diﬀerence 8,181*** 23,091*** 16,620***
U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (2,965) (3,877) (3,997)
Simple diﬀerence -5,022** -9,597** -12,813***
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (1,965) (4,706) (4,429)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 492.6 -10,041* -1,782
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,232) (5,526) (4,319)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 11,192*** 16,811*** 16,477***
U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,524) (4,032) (4,022)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences -2,011 -15,877** -12,956**
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ3 (2,641) (6,104) (5,103)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Tables 2a and 2b.
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Table 6a: Prais-Winsten Regression Results: Barro/Lee Skill Data
(7) (8) (9)
Regressor 14+ observation 5+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
sumgdp 24.25*** 18.92*** 24.10***
(2.498) (1.614) (2.517)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
d2skdgdpd 2.376*** 1.556*** 2.387***
(0.361) (0.205) (0.361)
d2skdsumg -2.898*** -2.025*** -2.908***
(0.367) (0.213) (0.368)
d1skdsumg -0.760*** -0.853*** -0.765***
(0.082) (0.094) (0.084)
invcosthost -77.626 -113.9 -74.83
(96.34) (84.40) (95.82)
topenhost 43.34 29.73 39.69
(32.03) (27.00) 32.22
topensrc 113.2*** 91.65*** 110.2***
(24.02) (21.73) (24.25)
distance -1.925*** -2.100*** -1.971***
(0.373) (0.429) (0.377)
β -2,134 -2,123 -1,645
(1,849) (1,482) (1,810)
γ1 -13,126** -2,188 -13,308**
(5,466) (5,023) (5,636)
γ2 2,286 3,059 3,415
(2,866) (2,654) (2,781)
γ3 56,608*** 45,306*** 54,833***
(10,114) (7,682) (9,771)
δ1 1,040 1,441 1,110
(1,295) (1,307) (1,290)
δ2 12,662*** 14,600*** 8,005**
(2,907) (2,952) (3,113)
δ3 1,531 1,666 1,059
(2,010) (1,464) (1,955)
Number of obs. 1,550 1,663 1,550
R2 0.48 0.44 0.46
Wald χ2 782.6 945.5 412.9
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average autocorr. 0.859 0.863 0.860
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Regressions correct for
first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each country
pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text for details.
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Table 6b: Robustness Checks: Barro/Lee Skill Data
(10) (11) (12)
Regressor Simple Skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple Skill
sumgdp 16.06*** 17.51*** 12.63***
(1.693) (3.316) (3.484)
gdpdiﬀsq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
d2skdgdpd 1.700***
(0.533)
d2skdsumg -1.989***
(0.482)
d1skdsumg -0.511***
(0.140)
Skill source 4,308*** 2,940***
(811.1) (865.6)
Skill host 2,986*** 3,590*
(993.0) (1,923)
invcosthost -152.8 79.64 210.4
(106.2) (261.9) (292.0)
topenhost 101.1*** 76.71 143.5*
(33.32) (70.69) (81.25)
topensrc 50.73** 90.63 46.76
(21.22) (61.98) (57.46)
distance -2.255*** -1.386*** -1.422***
(0.433) (0.427) (0.444)
β -2,739 3,058 682.9
(1,748) (3,223) (3,062)
γ1 1,313 -1,744 844.6
(6,117) (10,039) (12,032)
γ2 -3,779 5,195 2,595
(3,321) (4,122) (4,176)
γ3 68,565*** 36,302** 49,906***
(10,289) (14,109) (12,951)
δ1 1,984 -1,205 832.8
(1,425) (5,058) (4,573)
δ2 11,764*** 17,823*** 16,453***
(2,649) (3,723) (4,778)
δ3 921.5 -9,373 -9,137
(1,904) (5,735) (5,599)
Number of obs. 1,550 1,550 1,550
R2 0.42 0.44 0.37
Wald χ2 704.2 . .
Prob > χ2, p-value 0.00 . .
Average autocorr. 0.860 N/A N/A
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. All regressions include a constant and a time trend (not reported). Specification (10)
corrects for first-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coeﬃcients are estimated separately for each
country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. Specifications (11) and (12) compute an arbitrary
variance-covariance matrix. See the text for details.
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Table 7: The Eﬀect of NAFTA on North American FDI, Barro/Lee Skill Data
(7) (8) (9)
14+ observations 5+ observations Announcement Eﬀect
Simple diﬀerence -1,093 -682.9 -534.3
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,813) (1,516) (1,797)
Simple Diﬀerence 10,528*** 12,477*** 6,360*
U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (3,183) (3,012) (3,444)
Simple Diﬀerence -602.3 -457.2 -585.7
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (1,129) (974.9) (1,253)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 1,040 1,441 1,110
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,295) (1,307) (1,290)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 12,662*** 14,600*** 8,005**
U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,907) (2,952) (3,113)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 1,531 1,666 1,059
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ3 (2,010) (1,464) (1,955)
(10) (11) (12)
Simple skill Arbitrary VCE Arbitrary VCE
Base specif. Simple skill
Simple diﬀerence -754.7 1,853 1,516
U.S. FDI - β + δ1 (1,758) (2,561) (2,264)
Simple diﬀerence 9,024*** 20,881*** 17,136***
U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ2 (2,760) (3,446) (4,417)
Simple diﬀerence -1,818 -6,315 -8,454*
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - β + δ3 (1,455) (4,302) (4,559)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 1,984 -1,205 832.8
U.S. FDI - δ1 (1,425) (5,058) (4,573)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 11,764*** 17,823*** 16,453***
U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ2 (2,649) (3,723) (4,778)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 921.5 -9,372 -9,137
non-U.S. FDI in Mexico - δ3 (1,904) (5,735) (5,599)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Tables 4a and 4b.
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Figure 1: FDI Stock in the United States and Mexico (billions of dollars)
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Source: For Mexico: INEGI; for the United States: Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Appendix - Proofs
Lemma 1. The necessary condition for l∗ = {EM,UU} before integration is given by the
following inequalities:
Πubi(EM,UU) > Π
u
bi(EM,UM) (A.1)
Πebi(EM,UU) > Π
e
bi(EU,UU) (A.2)
Πebi(EM,UU) > Π
e
bi(EE,UU) (A.3)
which yield respectively
(1− t)[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(t− 1)2 − (1− t)1/2(1− 3t)]| {z }
A2
(A.4)
−cN [2(1− t)3/2]| {z }
A3
+ cM [(1− t)1/2 + (1− t)]| {z }
A4
> 0
φ[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + 3t)− (1− t)1/2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A5
(A.5)
−cN [(1− t)1/2 + (1− t)]| {z }
A4
+ 2cM < 0
cN − cM > tzN (A.6)
Compare (A.4) and (A.5). Assuming t ∈ (0, 1), the following will hold: (i) 0 < (1− t)A1 < A1,
(ii) 0 < A2 < A5 and (iii) 0 < A3 < A4 < 2. Moreover, since cN > cM > 0, zN > 0 and φ > 0,
when (A.4) holds, (A.5) does not hold. In other words, if Πubi(EM,UU) > Π
u
bi(EM,UM), then
Πebi(EM,UU) < Π
e
bi(EU,UU) for all parameter values, which violates condition (A.2), one of
the the necessary conditions for l∗ = {EM,UU}.
Proposition 1. Let firm u choose lu = UM as its optimum strategy after integration.
FDI diversion in U requires le = EU to be dominated by any other strategy for firm e. The
necessary condition is
Πeai(EU,UM) < Π
e
ai(EE,UM) (A.7)
which yields
[φ+ zN + cM − 2(1 + t)zN − 2cN ]2
9θ
<
[φ+ zN + cM − 2(1 + t)zN − 2cM ]2
9θ
(A.8)
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (??) and simplifying yields cM < cN which is
always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proposition 2. Let firm e choose le = EE as its optimum strategy. FDI creation in M
by firm u requires lu = UU to be dominated by lu = UM .
Πuai(EE,UU) < Π
u
ai(EE,UM) (A.9)
which yields
[(1− t)φ+ zN + cN − 2(1− t)(zN + cN)]2
9(1− t)2θ <
[(1− t)φ+ zN + cN − 2(1− t)(zN + cM)]2
9(1− t)2θ
(A.10)
Taking the square root of both sides in expression (A.10) and simplifying yields cN > cM which
is always true given that M is the low cost country.
Proposition 3. For l∗ = {EU,UU} before integration, the necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions are
Πubi(EU,UU) > Π
u
bi(EU,UM) (A.11)
Πebi(EU,UU) > Π
e
bi(EM,UU) (A.12)
For l∗ = {EM,UM} after integration, the necessary condition is
Πeai(EM,UM) > Π
e
ai(EE,UM) (A.13)
Suppose that (A.11) holds. Expression (A.12) yields
φ[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + t)− (1− t)1/2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A6
(A.14)
+cN [(1 + t)− (1− t)1/2]| {z }
A7
> 0
and expression (A.13) yields
φ[(1− t)1/2 − (1− t)]| {z }
A1
+ zN [(1 + t)− (1− t)1/2(1 + 2t)]| {z }
A6
+ 2cN (A.15)
−cM [((1− t)1/2 + (1− t)]| {z }
A4
> 0
Provided that t ∈ (0, 1), A4 + A7 = 2. Thus, since cN > cM when expression (A.14) holds, so
does expression (A.15).
